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1. Introduction 
Since the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970) it is a commonplace in the economics 
profession asymmetric information is an important source of market failures in 
competitive markets.  The standard model of adverse selection considers a static 
market with atomistic agents whose valuations depend on quality and a standard result 
is that only low quality goods are traded (if at all) even if the buyers are willing to pay 
more than the reservation price of sellers for each individual quality (see also, Wilson, 
1979, 1980).  This so-called lemons problem affects a large spectrum of markets, 
including the classic example of second-hand car markets, insurance markets, labor 
markets, financial markets and even the market for thoroughbred yearlings (Chezum 
and Wimmer (1996).  In many cases, the good under consideration is a durable good. 
Durability introduces two complicating factors in the used goods markets: goods 
not traded in any period can be offered for sale in the future and, in addition, new 
cohorts of potential sellers may enter the market over time.  Janssen and Roy (1999a, 
1999b) have investigated some of the issues that arise when durability is explicitly 
taken into account in a dynamic model.  Janssen and Roy (1999a) address the issue 
whether a given stock of goods can be traded over time.  They show that in any 
dynamic competitive equilibrium all goods eventually will be traded.  The main idea 
behind this result is that (due to a lower use value of the good) low quality sellers have 
less incentives to wait (before selling) compared to high quality sellers.  Once certain 
(low) qualities are sold, only relatively high qualities remain in the market.  Consumers 
can predict that sellers of different qualities will sort themselves into different time 
periods and, hence, they are willing to pay higher prices in later periods.  The 
equilibrium is thus one in which higher qualities are sold in later periods at higher 
prices. 
Janssen and Roy (1999b) address the same issue in the context of markets where 
identical cohorts of goods with uniformly distributed quality enter the market over time.  
In such markets, the infinite repetition of the static equilibrium under adverse selection 
is an equilibrium in the dynamic model.  In fact, it is the unique stationary equilibrium 
and also the only equilibrium where prices and average quality traded are (weakly) 
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monotonic over time.  They show that there exists at least one other equilibrium, 
however, where all goods are traded within finite time after they have entered the 
market.  This equilibrium is cyclical in prices and quantities in the sense that once all 
goods are traded, prices and quantities will fall.  Up to the moment all goods are sold, 
prices and expected quality monotonically increase. 
In this paper we extend the analysis of Janssen and Roy (1999b) in a number of 
ways.  First, we relax the assumption that in every period a cohort of uniformly 
distributed qualities enters the market.  Instead, we allow for any arbitrary distribution, 
which satisfies some mild regularity condition.  Second, our results are stronger in the 
sense that we show the existence of an infinite number of equilibria, where all goods are 
traded within finite time after they have entered the market. Hence, there is a strong 
sense in which a coordination problem is present in such dynamic markets. Finally, we 
show the extent to which the uniform distribution is special.  It turns out that for a set 
of values of the model's parameters and a set of distributions, which have relatively 
little probability mass in the neighborhood of the static equilibrium, it is impossible to 
construct a dynamic equilibrium with monotonically increasing prices and quantities 
up to the moment everything is sold.  We provide an example  where this is the case.  
Hence, the equilibrium construction for the uniform distribution does not extend 
naturally to the class of all distributions. 
The main economic insight provided by this paper is to give a different 
perspective on the adverse selection problem.  In the static Akerlof-Wilson model, the 
adverse selection problem manifests itself in the fact that relatively high quality goods 
cannot be traded despite the potential gains from trade.  In the dynamic market for 
durable goods, the lemons problem is not so much the impossibility of trading 
relatively high quality goods, but rather that sellers with relatively high quality goods 
need to wait in order to trade.1  So, the cost of waiting becomes an important factor in 
the welfare loss arising due to asymmetric information. Also, as there exists an infinite 
                                                 
1  There are certain situations in which the fact that a seller has waited for a long time might indicate low 
rather than high quality.  This would be true, for example, when the buyers can inspect quality - high 
valuation buyers are more likely to inspect and select the relatively high quality houses - leaving unsold 
goods of relatively low quality for later periods (Taylor, 1998).  A paper with a similar spirit is that of 
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number of equilibria, there is a serious coordination problem present in dynamic 
markets with adverse selection. 
Our specific model is as follows.  We consider a competitive market for a 
perfectly durable good where potential sellers are privately informed about the quality 
of the goods they own.  Each period, a cohort of sellers of equal size and with an 
identical, but arbitrary, distribution of quality enters the market.  The demand side is 
modeled in the following simple way.  Buyers are identical, have unit demand and for 
any given quality, a buyer’s willingness to pay exceeds the reservation price of a seller 
for that quality.  As buyers do not know the quality, their willingness to pay in a period 
equals the expected valuation of goods traded in that period.  Moreover, there are more 
buyers than sellers in each period so that in equilibrium, prices equal the expected 
valuation.  Once traded, goods are not re-sold in the same market.2 
 The Akerlof-Wilson model can be considered the static version of our model.  The 
adverse selection problem implies that in equilibrium only a certain range of low 
qualities is traded.  The infinitely repeated version of a static equilibrium outcome is 
also an equilibrium in our dynamic model.  Hence, the issue of existence of dynamic 
equilibria is easily resolved.  In this dynamic equilibrium high quality goods remain 
unsold forever. 
We concentrate on the existence of other equilibria with more interesting 
properties - where prices and average quality traded fluctuate over time.  We provide a 
characterization result saying that in all such equilibria the range of quality, which is 
eventually traded in the market, exceeds that in the stationary (static) outcome.  
Moreover, sellers of different qualities within each cohort of entrants separate 
themselves out over time.  As the use value of low quality goods is lower than that of 
high quality goods, low quality sellers sell earlier than high quality sellers, the owner 
of a good with lower quality trades earlier, owners of higher quality goods wait longer.  
In order to highlight the waiting aspect of the adverse selection problem and also to 
                                                                                                                                             
Vettas (1997).  As stated earlier, our model is designed to understand the nature of the lemons problem 
and so we do not allow for any technology which can directly modify the information structure. 
2  Our analysis bears some resemblance to that by Sobel (1991) of a durable goods monopoly where new 
cohorts of consumers enter the market over time.  Unlike our framework, there is no correlation between 
the valuations of buyers and sellers in his model. 
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sharpen the contrast between the properties of equilibria of our dynamic model with 
those of the static model, the main part of the analysis is devoted to proving the 
existence of an equilibrium where every potential seller entering the market trades 
within a certain finite number of periods after entering the market. We show in fact 
that an infinite number of these equilibria exist. 
There are three important intertemporal factors in the market which determine the 
market dynamics in all the non-stationary equilibria of our model.  First, once a certain 
range of quality is traded, only sellers of higher quality goods are left in the market, 
which tends to improve the distribution of quality of potentially tradable goods in the 
future.  Second, the entry of a new cohort of potential sellers with goods of all possible 
quality dilutes the average quality of potentially tradable goods - as they cannot be 
distinguished by buyers from higher quality sellers left over from the past.  Finally, as 
time progresses and stocks of untraded goods accumulate from the past, the new cohort 
of traders entering the market in any period becomes increasingly less significant in 
determining the distribution of quality of tradable goods.3 
Other recent literature4 on adverse selection has focused on various processes 
(such as signaling and screening) through which the difficulties of trading under 
asymmetric information may be resolved and has emphasized the role of non-market 
institutions in this context (such as certification intermediaries and leasing).  The 
present paper, in contrast, is motivated by a more basic issue which also underlies the 
original Akerlof paper viz., the functioning of the price mechanism in a perfectly 
competitive market when traders have private information.  It is important to 
understand the nature of market failures due to adverse selection before analyzing the 
role of institutions in mitigating these failures. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets out the model, the equilibrium 
concept and some preliminary results.  Section 3 provides a characterization result.  
                                                 
3  If there is no entry of sellers after the initial period, or equivalently, if buyers can distinguish the 
period of entry of sellers in the market, then only the first factor is relevant.  In that case, it has been 
shown earlier for fairly general distributions of quality (see, Janssen and Roy (1998)) that in every 
equilibrium all goods are traded in finite time.  Vincent (1990) analyzes a dynamic auction game with 
similar features. 
4  See, for instance, Guha and Waldman (1997), Hendel and Lizzeri (1999a,b), Lizzeri (1999) and 
Waldman, (1999). 
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The main result of the paper relating to the existence of an infinite number of equilibria 
where all goods are traded within finite time after entry into the market are outlined in 
section 4.  Section 5 concludes.  Proofs are contained in the Appendix. 
2. The Model 
Consider a Walrasian market for a perfectly durable good whose quality, denoted by 
q , varies between q  and q , where ¥<<< qq0 .  Time is discrete and is indexed by 
¥= K,2,1t .  Each time period t  a set of sellers tI  enters the market, I  is the set of all 
sellers, U
¥
=
=
1t
tII  and it  is the period of entry of seller Ii Î .  Each seller is endowed 
with one unit of the durable good of quality iq .  Let the total Lebesgue measure of 
sellers from the set tI  who own a good of quality less than or equal to q  be a function 
{ }( ) ( )qmqqm º£Î itIii , , which is independent of t .  We assume that ( )qm  is strictly 
increasing and absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. 
The measure of all sellers who enter the market in each period is strictly positive, 
so ( ) 0>qm .  Each seller i  knows the quality iq  of the good he is endowed with and 
derives flow utility from ownership of the good until he sells it.  Therefore, the seller's 
reservation price is the discounted sum of gross surplus due to ownership and we 
assume that it is exactly equal to iq .  Sthis implies that the per period gross surplus is 
( ) iqd-1 . 
Each time period t  a set of buyers, with measure larger than ( )qm , enters the 
market.  All buyers are identical and have unit demand.  A buyer's valuation of quality 
q  is equal to qv , where 1>v .  Thus, under full information, a buyer's valuation 
exceeds the seller's.  All buyers know the ex ante distribution of the sellers with respect 
to qualities but do not know the quality of the good offered by a particular seller.  
When a buyer buys a good he leaves the market forever.  All players discount the 
future with common discount factor d , 10 <<d .  They are risk neutral and rational 
agents. 
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We will denote expected quality of the good from seller i  conditional on the fact 
that he belongs to a certain subset II Ì¢  as { }( )I ¢h , this value is defined for all II Ì¢  
such that { }( ) 0>¢Im  and it follows that 
( ) ( ) ( )IdII Ii i
¢
¢
º¢ ò
¢Î
mq
m
h 1 . 
In order to have an adverse selection problem we assume ( ) qq <vE , where ( )qE  
is the unconditional expected quality of all goods, ( ) { }( ) { }( )IIE t hhq == .  This 
assumption implies that the static Akerlof-Wilson version of the model has a largest 
equilibrium quality, which we will denote by ( )qqq ,ÎS : 
[ ]{ }( ){ }qqqqhqq
q
=ÎÎ= ,,max iS Iiiv . 
To simplify our analysis we introduce the following two regularity assumptions.  
Throughout this paper, we assume that these assumptions hold.  Basically assumptions 
2.1 and 2.2 assure that the distribution of quality is sufficiently well-behaved for some 
left-neighborhood of Sq . 
Assumption 2.1. The measure function ( )qm  is strictly increasing and absolutely 
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on [ ]qeq m ,-S  for some 0>me .  
Moreover, there exist numbers mm Mm ,  such that for any qq ¢¢¢, , qqqeq m £¢¢<¢£-S : 
( ) ( )
( ) mm qq
qmqm
Mm <
¢-¢¢
¢-¢¢<<0 . 
Assumption 2.2.  The measure function ( )qm  is a differentiable function at Sqq =  and 
( ) ( ) 0>³= mqq
qm
mf
d
d
s . 
Given a sequence of market prices { }¥== 1ttpp  each seller i  chooses whether or not to 
sell and if he chooses to sell, the time period in which to sell.  If he chooses not to sell 
his gross surplus is equal to iq  and therefore his net surplus equals zero, while if he 
decides to sell in period itt ³  his gross surplus is 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t
tttt
it
tt
tt
it
tt
t
t
t
i ppp iii
i
i
i
i ---
-
-
-
=
- +-=+
-
--=+-å ddqdd
dqdddqd
t
t 1
1
1
11
1
, 
and, therefore, his net surplus equals 
( ) ( ) iii ttititttttii pps --- -=-+-= dqqddq 1 . 
The set of time periods in which it is optimal to sell for a seller i  is given by 
( ) { } ( ) ( ){ }0maxarg0maxarg ³--=³º -
³³
it
tt
it
tt
ii
tt
i ppssT i
ii
qdqp . 
If 0<- itp q  for all itt ³  then ( ) Æ=piT . 
Each potential seller i  chooses a time period ii TÎt  in which to sell.  Let 
{ } Iii Î= tô  be a set of all selling decisions.  We will denote a set of the sellers who 
choose time period t  for trade as tJ , and it follows that { }tIiJ it =Îº t .  This 
generates a certain distribution of qualities over all time periods and the expected 
quality of the goods offered for sale in time period t  is { }( )tt Jhh =  when { }( ) 0>tJm . 
In the sections that follow we will use the following additional notation: We 
denote by ( )tt qqm ,1-  the measure of sellers from tI  whose goods are of quality from 
the range [ ]tt qq ,1- : ( ) [ ]{ }( )tttt qqqmqqm ,,, 11 -- ÎÎ= itIii . It follows that 
( ) ( ) ( )11, -- -= tttt qmqmqqm  and ( ) ( )tttt qqmqqm ,, 11 -- -= . Moreover, ( )tt qqh ,1-  is used 
for the expected quality of goods from sellers who belong to tI  whose goods are of 
quality from the range [ ]tt qq ,1- : ( ) [ ]{ }( )tttt qqqhqqh ,,, 11 -- ÎÎ= itIii . It follows that 
for all qqqeq ttm £££- -1S ,  
 ( ) ( )
ï
ï
î
ïï
í
ì
=
¹ò
=
--
-
-
-
-
11
1
1
1
 if ,
 if ,
,
1
, 1
ttt
tt
q
qtt
tt
qqq
qqmq
qqmqqh
t
t
d
 
and ( ) ( )tttt qqhqqh ,, 11 -- = . 
 The following lemma assures that ( )tt qqh ,1-  is continuous in its arguments. 
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Lemma 2.1.  For all qqqeq ttm £££- -1S  the function ( )tt qqh ,1-  is a strictly 
increasing continuous function.  Moreover, hh Mm ,$ , such that 
( ) ( )
( ) htt
tttt
h qq
qqhqqh
Mm <
-
-<<
-
---
1
111 ,,0 . 
A dynamic equilibrium is an equilibrium where all players rationally maximize 
their objectives, expectations are fulfilled and markets clear in every period. On the 
equilibrium path, buyers' expectations of quality in a period where a strictly positive 
measure of goods is offered for sale must equal the expected quality in that time 
period.  As all buyers are identical, we assume that their expectations of quality in 
period t  are symmetric and denoted by tE . 
Definition 2.1.  A dynamic equilibrium is described in terms of a sequence of prices 
{ }¥== 1ttpp , a set of selling decision { } Iii Î= tô  and a sequence of buyers' quality 
expectations { }¥== 1ttEE  such that: 
a) Seller maximize: ( )pii TÎt  for all Ii Î , i.e., seller i  chooses time period it  to 
trade optimally. 
b) Buyers maximize and market clear: If { }( ) 0>tJm  then tt vEp = , i.e., if there is 
a strictly positive amount of trade in time period t , then each buyer earns zero net 
surplus so that he is indifferent between buying and not buying and market clears.  
If { }( ) 0=tJm  then tt vEp ³ , i.e., if zero measure of trade occurs in time period t  
then each buyer can earn at most zero net surplus.  Hence, not buying is optimal 
for him in that period. 
c) Expectations are fulfilled when trade occurs : If { }( ) 0>tJm  then ttE h= . 
d) Expectations are reasonable even if no trade occurs: For all t  q³tE . 
Given the set-up described above, conditions (a)-(c) are quite standard. Condition 
(d) is introduced for the formal reason that expected quality is not defined when no 
trade occurs. The condition says that even in periods in which (at most) zero measure 
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of seller intends to sell, buyers should believe that the expected quality is larger than 
the apriori lowest possible quality.  This condition assures that autarky, i.e., no trade in 
any period, cannot be sustained in an equilibrium of the dynamic model.  Given the 
condition, the willingness to pay, hence the price in any period, is restricted from 
below by qv  and sellers with low enough qualities prefer to sell against this price 
rather than not sell. 
3. Characterization of equilibrium. 
We start the analysis characterizing the properties of any dynamic equilibrium.  In the 
Proposition 3.1 below we first argue that if a good of certain quality sells in period t , 
then all goods with lower qualities that have entered the market in and before period t  
will also sell in that period.  This fact allows us to define for each period a marginal 
seller tq  as the seller of the highest quality in period t .  It also allows us to define ts  as 
the surplus of the marginal seller in period t , i.e., ttt ps q-= .  This part of the 
Proposition 3.1 basically follows from the fact that the use value of low qualities is 
lower than the use value of high qualities so that low qualities are more ready to sell. 
The second part of the Proposition 3.1 argues that the marginal seller in any period 
makes non-negative net surplus.  This implies that the other sellers in that period make 
strictly positive surplus. 
The third part of the Proposition 3.1 argues that the marginal seller in period t  is 
indifferent between selling in period t  and selling in the first future period in which a 
quality larger than his own quality is sold.  Prices in that future period will be higher, 
reflecting higher average quality, but the discounted surplus is such that the seller is 
indifferent. 
The last part of the Proposition 3.1 says that if it exists the highest quality that will 
ever be sold in any dynamic equilibrium is either equal to q  or it is such that the seller 
makes zero surplus.  It is clear that if a seller makes zero net surplus, prices in all 
future periods cannot be higher as then this seller will have an incentive to wait and 
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sell in that future period.  This part also says that if the highest quality sold in a 
dynamic equilibrium makes strictly positive surplus, then it must be equal to q . 
Proposition 3.1.  Any dynamic equilibrium has the following properties. 
a) For all t  and all [ ]qqq ,Ît : if tt JÎq , then [ ]{ }ttiJ itit £Î= ,,qqq , i.e., in every 
period t  in which trade occurs the set of qualities traded is a range [ ]tqq, , where 
tq  is the marginal quality traded in period t .  All sellers who are in the market at 
t  and own goods of quality not larger than tq  prefer to trade in that time period. 
b) ttp q³ . 
c) Let ( ) { }tttt qqt tt >= >min
~ , i.e., ( )tt~  is the first period after t  where tqqt > .  Then 
( )
( )( )tttttttt pp qdq -=- - ~~ , i.e., the marginal seller in period t  is just indifferent 
between selling in that period and in the first next period where the marginal 
quality is larger than his own quality. 
d) If ( ) ÷
ø
öç
è
æ=
>
t
t
q
t
tt maxargminˆ  then ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 0ˆˆˆ =-- ttttttp qqq , i.e., if ( )ttˆq  is the first 
largest marginal quality for all periods after period t, then either this is the highest 
possible quality q  or the surplus of the corresponding marginal seller equals zero. 
It is easily seen that the infinitely repeated outcome of the static model is a 
dynamic equilibrium of our model.  Hence, existence of equilibrium is not really an 
issue.  In the next section, we will show that in the dynamic model there are infinitely 
many other equilibria, each one starting from a certain neighborhood of the largest 
static equilibrium quality. 
4. Equilibria Trading all Goods. 
We will now show that for any measure function ( )qm  which satisfies Assumptions 
2.1 and 2.2 and for all generic values of the parameters v , d , q  and q  there exist an 
infinite number of dynamic equilibria covering all qualities up to q .  As we already 
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know that our model has at least one equilibrium, a general existence proof is trivial.  
That is why we use a constructive proof showing how to find an equilibrium sequence 
of marginal qualities that is such that all qualities up to q  are traded.  The fact that 
there are infinitely many dynamic equilibria follows from the fact that if there exists a 
dynamic equilibrium covering all qualities up to q  starting from some Sqq <1 , then we 
can show that there also exists a dynamic equilibrium covering all qualities up to q  
starting from a '1q , with Sqqq <<
'
11 . 
Before we will go into the details of the analysis, we first introduce an important 
parameter.  Assumption 2.2 allows us to define a parameter a , which describes the 
relation between the distribution of quality over the range [ ]Sqq,  and the marginal 
distribution at Sq  itself: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )S
S
sS
S
fv
d
d
va
qm
qq
q
qmq
qm
1
1
1 -=-º . 
Obviously, a  is strictly positive.  We will provide an economic interpretation of 
the parameter a and argue that generically, it must be that 1<a .  To this end, consider 
the surplus of the marginal seller in the static model as a function of q : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) qqmqqmqqhqqq
q
q
-=-=-º ò dvvps
1
, and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11
1 -=-÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
= ò add
d
v
d
ds
SS qqmqqmq
q
q
q q
q
. 
Hence, a-1 can be interpreted as the way in which the surplus of the marginal seller 
changes in the neighborhood of the largest static equilibrium quality. Thus, the surplus 
of the marginal seller can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )SSSSSS oaod
ds
ss qqqqqqqqq
q
qqq -+--=-+-+º 1 . (1) 
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Suppose then that 1>a .5  This would imply that ( ) 0>qs  in some right 
neighborhood of Sq .  But this contradicts the assumption that Sq  is the highest static 
equilibrium quality. 
In the uniform case, we have va 2
1= 6.  As in the uniform case adverse selection 
implies that 21 << v , the uniform distribution is a special case of the case when 
( )1,21Îa .  In subsection 4.1 we will start with this simplest case, which generalizes the 
analysis in Janssen and Roy (1999b).  We show that one can construct a "monotonic" 
sequence of marginal qualities tq  that are strictly increasing over time until all goods 
are sold.  The main reason why the case ( )1,21Îa  is to be distinguished from other 
cases can be seen by looking at equation (1).  If we choose Sqq =1 , then in the second 
period, the measure of qualities above Sq  that are not yet sold is two times as high as 
the original measure.  If ( )1,21Îa , the distribution of qualities in the second period is 
such that a new "static" equilibrium emerges that is larger than Sq .  As in the second 
period we can write ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )SSSS oaas qqqqqqqqq --+----= 12122 ,12  it 
possible to choose 1q  close enough to Sq  such that 12 qq >  and 02 >s . 
If 2
1<a , however, it may not be possible to construct such a "monotonic" 
equilibrium and we show this by example.  In subsection 4.2 we show that dynamic 
equilibria nevertheless exist if ( )( )daa ~,0Î , where ( )da~  is some decreasing function 
of d .  The kind of equilibrium we obtain has marginal qualities tq  strictly decreasing 
for some initial time periods after which they strictly increase until all goods are sold.  
The general theorem covering all values of a and d  is provided in subsection 4.3.  As 
the equilibrium construction here becomes quite complicated, subsections 4.1 and 4.2 
are also provided for didactical reasons. 
The construction of equilibrium uses an "equilibrium sequence" which is defined 
below. 
                                                 
5  The case where 1=a  is a non-generic case. 
6  This easily follows from the fact that qq vvS -= 2  and ( ) ( )qqqm -= SS f . 
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Definition 4.1.  An equilibrium sequence ( )UTQ  is a finite sequence of marginal 
qualities tq  as functions of 1q , the latter being defined over some range ( )11 ,qq=U , 
i.e., ( ) ( ){ }TttT U 11 ==Q qq , such that all equilibrium conditions in Definition 2.1 hold for 
all 1,,1 -= Tt K .  Moreover, for all UÎ1q : 
a) ( )1qqt  is continuous for all Tt ,,1 K= ; 
b) ( ) ( )11 qqqq tT >  for all 1,,1 -= Tt K ; 
c) ( )1qh ttt pvp == , the price in period t  is continuous; 
The above definition does not imply the existence of an equilibrium sequence.  
However, it easy to see that there exists at least one equilibrium sequence, namely 
( )( ) { }11 , qqeq m =-Q SS , such that all mentioned above conditions are trivially satisfied. 
The main property of an equilibrium sequence we use is that if there is a dynamic 
equilibrium with marginal qualities { }¥=1ttq  such that for T,,1K=t  it can be described 
by a certain equilibrium sequence ( ) ( ){ }TttT U 11 ==Q qq , then there is only one 
indifference equation, namely 
( )( )
( )( )TTtTTtTT pp qdq -=- - ~~ , (2) 
which relates prices tp  and marginal qualities tq  for ¥+= K,1Tt  to prices kp  and 
marginal qualities kq  for Tk ,,1 K=  (this follows from (b) above).  Intuitively, Tq  
summarizes all the relevant properties of the sequence of marginal qualities up to time 
period T .  Our purpose, therefore, is to find an equilibrium sequence such that 
( ) qqq =1T  for some T  and 1q . 
4.1 The case where 2
1>a . 
In this subsection we prove the existence of an increasing sequence Ttt 1}{ =q , where 
qq =T  when 2
1>a .  As the uniform distribution is a special case, the result obtained in 
this section shows to what extent the results obtained in Janssen and Roy (1999b) can 
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be generalized to allow for other types of distribution functions.  The following 
theorem contains a statement of the formal result. 
Theorem 4.1.  For any ( )1,21Îa  and for any generic value of q , there exist an infinite 
number of dynamic equilibria such that all goods are sold within T periods after 
entering the market. The sequence Ttt 1}{ =q  is monotonically increasing. 
The proof consists of three steps.  In Proposition 4.1 we prove that it is possible to 
construct an equilibrium sequence of an arbitrary length where marginal qualities { }tq  
are strictly increasing and very close to the static equilibrium quality Sq .  Under these 
circumstances the main indifference equation (2) takes the following form: 
( )tttt pp qdq -=- +1 . (3) 
In other words, the marginal seller in period t  is just indifferent between selling in 
that period and in the next period.  We will denote such monotonic equilibrium 
sequences as ( )U1Q  and call a dynamic equilibrium, which is based on them, as 
"dynamic equilibrium of type I". 
Proposition 4.1.  If ( )1,21Îa , then there exist an infinite number of ( )U1Q .  Moreover, 
for 12
1
-³" age  0T$  such that for all 0Tt >  ( )( )St tU qq ,010 =$  and ( )01 tt UQ$  such that: 
a) for all t,,1K=t  ( )1qqt  is differentiable at Sqq =1  and ( ) SS qqqt = ; 
b) for all 01 tUÎq  ( ) ( )1110 qeqqq dg tSt s<-< . 
Proposition 4.1 implies that if ( )1,21Îa , we can construct an equilibrium sequence 
of an arbitrarily long length t  such that in period 1+t  there will be more sellers with 
high quality ( Si qq > ) goods than the number of sellers with low quality ( Si qq < ).  
This allows us to expand the equilibrium sequence tQ  for some more periods. 
Next, in Proposition 4.2, we prove that when we are able to construct an 
equilibrium sequence of an arbitrary length where all marginal qualities belong to a 
certain neighborhood of Sq , then we can expand it in such a way that the surplus of the 
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last marginal quality tq  could be made any value between 0 and ( ) tv q1- .  More 
precisely, given any equilibrium sequence tQ  with ( ) ( )1110 qeqqq dg tSt s<-<  we can 
construct another sequence t¢Q , where tt >¢ , such that tt ¢QÌQ  and ( )1qtp  covers the 
whole interval ( ) ( )( )11 , qqqq tt v .  The conditions under which the Proposition 4.2 holds 
are the same as the conclusion reached in Proposition 4.1.  These conclusions are 
replicated here as in later subsections we will also make use of it. 
Proposition 4.2.  If there exist 0>ge  and 0T  such that for all 0Tt >  ( )( )St tU qq ,010 =$  
and ( )0tt UQ$  such that for all 01 tUÎq  ( ) ( )111 qeqqq dg tSt s<- , then for any 0>Se  and 
0>qe  ST$  such that for all STt ³  ( )( ) 01 , tSSSt UtU Ì=$ qq  and ( )Stt UQ$  such that: 
a) for any StUÎ1q  ( ) qeqqq <- St 1 ; 
b) ( ) 0=Sts q ; 
c) ( ) ( ) ( ) SStSt vs eqqq --> 11 1 . 
Proposition 4.2 tells us that if we could trade goods for many time periods and, 
therefore, accumulate "high quality sellers", then we can organize trade in such a way 
that in the last time period of the equilibrium sequence "almost" all sellers who prefer 
to sell in that period will have goods of quality very close to Sq . 
Finally, in Proposition 4.3 we prove that if we are able to trade goods along an 
equilibrium path from a certain range of qualities such that the price in the last period 
of the equilibrium sequence can be made any value between the marginal quality and 
buyer's valuations of the marginal quality, then we can expand that equilibrium 
sequence in such a way that wider range of qualities could be traded with the same 
properties.  Doing so, after a finite number of iterations we generically can construct an 
equilibrium sequence where qq =T , i.e., all goods are traded by period T. 
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Proposition 4.3.  If ( ) [ )qqq ,Sk Î$  such that for any 0>Se  and 0>qe  ( )kST$  such that 
for all ( )kSTt >  
( ) ( ) ( )( )ktktU kt ,,, 11 qq=$ 7 and ( )( )ktt UQ$  such that: 
a) for all ( )ktUÎ1q  ( ) ( ) qeqqq <- kt 1 ; 
b) ( )( ) St kts eq <£ ,0 1 ; 
c) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) Stt ktvkts eqqq --> ,1, 11 ; 
then either 
a) 0>$ Se  such that for any T  Tt >$ , ( )t1~q$  and ( )1~qtQ$  such that ( ) qqq =1~t  and 
( ) Sts eq >1~ , or 
b) for any 0>Se  and 0>qe  
( ) ( )( ]qqq ,1 kk vÎ$ +  and ( )1+$ kST  such that for all 
( )1+> kSTt  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )ktkt UktktU Ì++=$ + 1,,1, 111 qq  and ( )( )1+Q$ ktt U  such that: 
· for all ( )11
+Î ktUq  ( ) ( ) qeqqq <- +11 kt ; 
· ( )( ) St kts eq <+£ 1,0 1 ; 
· ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) Stt ktvkts eqqq -+->+ 1,11, 11 . 
Proposition 4.3 basically says that if we have constructed an equilibrium sequence 
for a sufficiently large number of periods, then we can either make sure that after some 
more time periods the next marginal quality can be chosen relatively far from the 
present marginal quality and such that all desirable properties are kept (case (b)) or we 
can reach q  (case (a)). 
Propositions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 taken together give us a large part of the proof of 
Theorem 4.1. 
                                                 
7  Here we don't make a distinction between 11 qq <  and 11 qq > .  All we need is 
( )k
tU  to be a nonempty 
open set while 
1q  and 1q  are its boundary points. 
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4.2 The case of small a  and d . 
In this section, we construct an equilibrium sequence for the case when a and d are 
small.  We first provide an example showing why the analysis of the previous 
subsection does not continue to be valid.  The example shows that when a and d are 
small there does not exist a 12 qq >  such that 02 ³s  and such that 1q  is indifferent 
between selling in period 1 and selling in period 2. 
Example 4.1 Let us take 2.1=v , 1.0=d , 10=q , 13=q  and a measure function 
( )qm  such that ( ) 010 =m  and 
( )
î
í
ì
<<
<<
=
qq
qq
qm
q 1,10 if      ,1
1.10 if  ,101
d
d
. 
The static equilibrium quality for this case is unique and equals 12.31 5.151 »=Sq . 
In any dynamic equilibrium we must have [ ]Sqqq ,1 Î  (otherwise we would have 
01 <s ).  The following picture 4.1 shows the graph of functions ( )12 2 XX q=  and 
( )12 2 XsS =  where 11 q=X . 
-20
0
20
40
10 10.5 11 11.5 12
X1 
X
2,
S2
X2 S2 Static quality
 
Figure 4.1. 
It is easy to see that for any value of 1q  we get ( )12 qq  above Sq  and the surplus in 
the second period is negative. // 
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We will now prove that if a is relatively small, particularly if ( )( )21,0 d-Îa , then 
we are still able to construct infinitely many dynamic equilibria such that all goods 
from the range [ ]qq,  are traded.  The equilibrium sequence is non-monotonic.  Note 
that the parameter configuration analyzed here partially overlaps with the parameter 
configuration analyzed in the previous subsection.  The result we will prove is formally 
stated in Theorem 4.2 below. 
Theorem 4.2.  For any ( )2)1(,0 d-Îa , and for any generic value of q , there exist an 
infinite number of dynamic equilibria such that all goods are sold in finite time after 
entering the market. 
In order to prove this theorem we only need to show that when ( )2)1(,0 d-Îa  it 
is also possible to construct an equilibrium sequence of an arbitrary large length t  
where marginal qualities { }tq  are very close to the static equilibrium quality Sq .  We 
will construct a sequence that is strictly decreasing for some time, tt qq <+1 , and only 
the last marginal quality Tq  exceeds all previous ones.  We denote such a sequence as 
"equilibrium sequence of type II" and write ( )U2Q . 
In this case our indifference equation (2) becomes the following system: 
( )tttt qdq -=- - tT pp , T,,1 K=t . (4) 
Proposition 4.4.  If ( )2)1(,0 d-Îa , then there exist an infinite number of ( )U2Q .  
Moreover, for 0>" ge  0T$  such that for all 0Tt >  ( )( )St tU qq ,010 =$  and ( )02 tt UQ$  
such that: 
a) for all t,,1K=t  ( )1qqt  is differentiable at Sqq =1  and ( ) SS qqqt = ; 
b) for all 01 tUÎq  ( ) ( )1110 qeqqq dg tSt s<-< . 
Note that the conclusions reached in Proposition 4.4 are identical to the 
conclusions reached in Proposition 4.1 so that we can make use of Propositions 4.2 and 
4.3 to get the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
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4.3 The General case. 
Finally, we prove that for any value of a , we are able to construct infinitely many 
dynamic equilibria such that all goods in [ ]qq,  are traded.  The structure of the 
corresponding equilibrium sequences becomes a mixture of the equilibrium sequences 
of type I and type II. 
Theorem 4.3.  For any generic value of q , there exist an infinite number of dynamic 
equilibria such that all goods are sold in finite time after entering the market. 
Again, like in subsection 4.2, the only thing we need to prove is that it is possible 
to construct an equilibrium sequence of an arbitrary large length where marginal 
qualities { }tq  are very close to the static equilibrium quality Sq .  This is the content of 
Proposition 4.5. 
Proposition 4.5.  There exist an infinite number of ( )UQ .  Moreover, for 0>" ge  0T$  
and 1³$ mk  such that for all 0Tt >  ( )( )Smtk tkU m qq ,1010 1 +=$ +  and ( )0 11 ++Q$ mm tktk U  such 
that: 
a) for all 1,,1 += mtkKt  ( )1qqt  is differentiable at Sqq =1  and ( ) SS qqqt = ; 
b) for all 0 11 +Î mtkUq  ( ) ( )111110 qeqqq dg ++ <-< mm tkStk s . 
The main difference with the related Propositions 4.1 and 4.4 is that here the 
equilibrium sequence constructed around Sq  is partly composed of increasing 
subsequences and partly composed of decreasing subsequences.  Therefore, we need 
two indices ( t  and mk ) to keep track of the whole equilibrium sequence. 
Note that the conclusions reached in Proposition 4.5 are again identical to the 
conclusions reached in Proposition 4.1 so that we can make use of Propositions 4.2 and 
4.3 to get the proof of Theorem 4.3. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have provided a different perspective on the way the adverse selection 
problem manifests itself in durable good markets, where entry takes place in the same 
market.  In the static Akerlof-Wilson model, adverse selection results in high quality 
goods not being able to trade despite the potential gains from trade.  The infinite 
repetition of this static equilibrium is also an equilibrium in the dynamic model where 
a durable good is traded in a competitive market.  Our main result in this paper, is that 
there are infinitely many other equilibria where all goods are sold within finite time 
after entering the market.  In each of these dynamic equilibria, the marginal quality that 
is sold in the first period lies in a small neighborhood of the static equilibrium.  This 
result holds true for all generic values of the parameters governing the behavior of 
buyers and sellers and the distribution of qualities in the population of sellers. 
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Appendix. 
In the appendix we will use the following additional notation. 
a) 
( ) ( )
( )1
111 ,,
-
---
-
-=
tt
tttt
t qq
qqhqqh
K ; (5) 
b) 
( )
( )1
1 ,
-
-
-
=
tt
tt
t qq
qqm
F ; (6) 
c) 1--= ttt qqy ; (7) 
d) 1--= ttt yyz ; (8) 
e) tdtg s
1= ; 
f) ( )
( )( )
( )ïî
ï
í
ì
=-=
¹-
=
®
-
S
S
ag
v
g
S
S
qqq
qqqqhq
q
qq
qq
 if ,1lim
 if ,,1
; (9) 
g) ( )
[ ]
( )qq
qqq
gg
S ,
max
Î
= ; 
h) ( ) 111 1 --- --= ttt v gqj . (10) 
Proof of Lemma 2.1 is on request.  
Proof of Proposition 3.1.  We prove all statements of the proposition sequentially. 
a) Let us take any period t  of positive amount of trade tJ  so that ( ) 0>tJm  and take 
any tJi Î .  By the definition of dynamic equilibrium we can write: 
( ) ( ){ }0maxarg ³--Î -
³
i
t
i
t
ppt i
i
qdq t
t
t
t
. 
This implies ( ) ( ) ii tittit pp -- -³- tt dqdq  for all itt ³>t .  Now take any iqq < : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) .01 >--³
³--+---=---
--
-----
i
iiiii
ttt
i
tt
i
t
i
tt
it
ttt
t pppp
ddqq
dddqqdqdqdqdq
t
tt
t
t
t  
So, for all sellers with a good of quality less then iq  who are still in the market in 
a certain period and have not yet traded it is optimal to trade in that period.  Thus, 
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we can define tq  as { }ti
i
t Ji Î= qq sup  and then it is easy to see that 
[ ]{ }ttiJ itit £Î= ,,qqq .  Finally, if 0)( =tJm  for some t , then we set qq =t . 
b) By the equilibrium definition, for all t  q³tE  and tt vEp ³  so that qvpt ³ .  
Thus, if ( ) 0=tJm , we have tt vp qqq =>³ .  If ( ) 0>tJm , it is optimal for the 
marginal seller tq  to trade in period t  and a necessary condition is 0³- ttp q .  
So, ttp q³  for all t . 
c) Suppose ( )( ) 0~~ >=--- - sqdq tttttt pp .  Then, we can find a seller i  of quality 
sqq 2
1+= ti  such that tit ~qqq <<  and tti £ , i.e., he is in the market by period t .  
By definition of { }tq  he will trade in period t~ .  But it can be shown that this is not 
optimal: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ] 01 ~212121~~ <-+-=+--+- ---- tttttttttttt iii pp dssdsqdsqd . 
So, it is not possible that ( )( ) ( )( )tttttttt pp qdq ->- - ~~ .  A similar argument shows 
that it is impossible to have ( )( ) ( )( )tttttttt pp qdq -<- - ~~ . 
d) Suppose 0ˆ >=- sqq t .  We will show that in this case 0ˆˆ =- ttp q .  Suppose not.  
Then it must be 0ˆˆ >=- eqttp .  Let us take a seller i  of quality 
{ }seqq ,min21ˆ += ti  such that qqq << itˆ  and tti ˆ= .  By definition of { }tq  he will 
never trade because for all itt ³  { } ittttt qqqq <=£ ³ ˆˆmax .  If he, however, traded in 
period tˆ  he would get 
{ } { } 0,min,min 212121ˆˆˆ >³-=--=- eseeseqq ttit pp , which is a contradiction. 
So, it must be the case that ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 0ˆˆˆ =-- ttttttp qqq .  
Proof of Proposition 4.1.  Using the fact that ( ) ( )111 qqqq tt ->  we express the expected 
quality sold in period t  in terms of ( )tt qqm ,1-  and ( )tt qqh ,1- : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )11
1111
1 ,,
,,,,
,
--
----
- +
+=
ttt
tttttt
ttt qqmqqtm
qqmqqhqqmqqthqqh , 1³t , qq º0 . (11) 
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Now we consider the indifference condition (3) with tt hvp = .  It can be written 
for 2³t  as ( ) ( ) 111211 ,, ------ =- tddtttttt qqhqqh sv . (12) 
The main part of the proof is by induction.  At first we will prove that if all 
conditions to be proved (except ( ) St qqq >1 ) are true for some 2>t , then 
( ) ( )111 qqqq tt >$ +  such that those conditions are also true for 1+t .  Next, we will show 
that there exist 1q  and 2q  such that those conditions are satisfied.  Finally, we will 
show that for some 0T  we get ( ) ST qqq >10  and, therefore, ( ) St qqq >1  for all 0Tt >  and 
all 001 0Tt UU ÌÎq . 
Suppose that for some 2>t  ( )( )St tU qq ,1010 1 -=$ - , ( ){ } 111 -=$ ttt qq , and ( ){ } 111 -=$ tp tt q  
such that for all 0 11 -Î tUq : 
a) ( ) ( )111 qqqq tt -> , ( ) 01 >qts ; ( ) SS qqqt = , ( ) 0=Ss qt ; 
b) tq  and ts  are continuous functions differentiable at Sqq =1  so that we can write: 
( )( ) ( )SSSS od
d qqqqq
q
qqq tt -+-+= 11
1
, and ( )( ) ( )SSS od
ds
s qqqqq
q
t
t -+-= 11
1
; 
c) ( ) 0
1
<Sd
ds q
q
t , ( ) 0
1
<Sd
dy q
q
t , ( ) 0
1
<Sd
dz q
q
t ; 
d) for all 2,,1 -= tKt  ( )tttt qdq -=- +1pp ; 
e) for all 2,,1 -= tKt  ( ) ( ) 0
1
1 £- - Sd
ssd q
q
b tt , where ( )d
db a
a
2
12 --= . 
We will prove that then ( )( ) 0 1010 , -Ì=$ tSt UtU qq  such that for all 01 tUÎq  equation 
(12) determines a unique value of tq  as a function of 1q  and 
a) ( ) ( )111 qqqq -> tt , ( ) 01 >qts ; ( ) SSt qqq = , ( ) 0=Sts q ; 
b) tq  and ts  are continuous functions differentiable at Sqq =1  so that we can write: 
( )( ) ( )SSStSt od
d qqqqq
q
qqq -+-+= 11
1
, and ( )( ) ( )SSStt od
ds
s qqqqq
q
-+-= 11
1
; 
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c) ( ) 0
1
<Std
ds q
q
, ( ) 0
1
<Std
dy q
q
, ( ) 0
1
<Std
dz q
q
; 
d) 
( ) ( ) 0
1
1 <- - Stt d
ssd q
q
b
, where ( )d
db a
a
2
12 --= , and ( ) ( ) 12 211 -<- atSt s qqqq . 
Let us first consider the left-hand side of the equation (12) as a function 
( ) ( ) ( )121121 ,,,, ------ -º ttttttttttG qqhqqhqqq .  It is easily seen that as qqq ³³ -- 21 tt  
evaluating ( )21,, -- ttttG qqq  at 1-= tt qq  yields ( ) 0,, 211 £--- ttttG qqq .  So, 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )111121111 0,, qqqqqqq dd ----- <£ tvtttt sG  for any 0 11 -Î tUq .  Also, for any small 
0>e  such that qeq <+S , ( ) ( )( ) 0,, 21 >+ -- StStStG qqqqeq .  As 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0,, 1121 =>+ ---- StvStStSt sG qqqqqeq dd  and as ( )1qtG  and ( )11 q-ts  are both 
continuous functions, there must exist a neighborhood ( )( ) 0 1010 , -Ì= tSt UtU qq  such that 
for any 01 tUÎq  ( ) ( )( ) ( )1111211 ,, qqqqqeq dd ---- >+ tvttSt sG .  Finally, ( )21,, -- ttttG qqq  is a 
strictly increasing continuous function w.r.t. tq . 
Taking all these facts together and applying the intermediate point theorem we can 
draw the following conclusion.  For all 01 tUÎq  there exists a unique continuous 
function ( )1qqt  such that ( ) ( ) eqqqqq +<<- Stt 111 .  ( ) ( ) ttttt vs qqqhq -= - ,11  is also 
continuous function and ( ) SSt qqq = , ( ) 0=Sts q . 
To prove the rest of step (b) of our induction step, we will now show that ( )1qqt  
and ( )1qts  both are differentiable functions at Sqq =1 .  For all t,,2 K=t  the 
indifference condition (3) can be written as ( ) ( ) 1112111 ,, ------ -= tddtttdttt qqqhqqh v .  
Taking the first differentials of this identity w.r.t. 1q  at Sqq =1 , and using (11), we get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ,,,1
,,,,1
,,
,,,,
1
1
212
2212121
11
1111
-
-
---
------
--
----
-÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
+-
+-=
=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+
+
td
d
ttt
tttttt
d
ttt
tttttt
q
qqmqqmt
qqmqqhqqmqqht
qqmqqtm
qqmqqhqqmqqth
SvS
S
dd
d
 
where 
S
ddS qqtt qq == 1 .  Taking the derivatives explicitly into account yields 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
.
,,1
21
,
,,1
21
,,
,
,,
1
1
21
1
211
1111
-
-
--
-
--
----
-
-÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+-
----
+-
---=
=
+
+--
+
+-
td
d
tt
t
tt
d
ttt
t
ttt
q
qqmqqmt
qtqtqqh
qqmqqmt
qtqtq
qqmqqtm
qqqtqqh
qqmqqtm
qqqqqqt
Sv
SSS
SS
SS
SSS
SS
S
SSS
SSS
SS
SSS
SSSSSS
d
dd
f
dd
f
fdfdfddfdfdf
 
Rewriting gives 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1211 1211 ---- -----=-- ttttt qdqtqtqtqtd SSSSS dddadda , and 
( )( )( ) ( ) 211 211 --- ----+= tdtt qttdqqtd SaSS ddd . (13) 
So we can write ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )SSaS d
d
d
d
d
d q
q
q
td
tq
q
q
td
td
q
q
q tt
d
t
1
2
1
1
1
1
211 --
- --
--+
= .  As, by 
assumption, 1-tq  and 2-tq  both are differentiable at Sqq =1  so is ( )1qqt .  Also, as 
surplus is defined by ( ) ttttttt vps qqqhq -=-= -1, , ts  is also differentiable at Sqq =1 . 
Next, we prove part (c) of the induction argument.  To this end, we can rewrite 
(13), using (7) and (8) in the following way: 
( ) ( )( ) 21111 1 ----- ----= tddtt qdttd Sa aaSS dydyd , and 
( )( )( ) ( )( )a aSa aSS ydzdzd 12121211 3 ------ ++-= dtdtt ttd . (14) 
Using the induction assumptions, we have ( ) 0
1
2 <- Std
dy q
q
, ( ) 0
1
1 <- Std
dy q
q
 and 
( ) 0
1
1 <- Std
dz q
q
 so it follows from (14) that ( ) 0
1
<Std
dz q
q
, and 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
11
1
1
<+= - StStSt d
dz
d
dy
d
dy q
q
q
q
q
q
. 
Similarly, we can get the following expressions for the first differentials of the 
surpluses tS sd : 
( ) ( ) ttt qt SSS daydasd ---= 11 , and (15) 
( ) ( ) ( )121 11 -+-=- -- aydazdssd SSS tttt t . (16) 
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Again, by our induction assumptions we have ( ) 0
1
1 <- Std
ds q
q
 and it follows that 
( ) ( ) 0
1
1 <- - Sttd
ssd q
q
, and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
1
1
1
1
1
<-+= -- SttStSt d
ssd
d
ds
d
ds q
q
q
q
q
q
. 
The only parts of the induction argument we still have to prove are 
( ) ( ) 0
1
1 <- - Stt d
ssd q
q
b
 and for all t  ( )( ) 0010 , tSt UtU Î=$ qq  such that for all 01 tUÎq  
( ) ( )111 qbq -> tt ss , where ( )d db aa 2 12 --= . 
Subtracting (15) for 1-t  from (15) for t  we can write 
( ) ( ) ( )( )111 121 --- ------=- tttttt qqtt SSSSSS ddaydaydasdsd , or 
( ) ( ) 11 21 -- ---=- tttt tt ydaydasdsd SSSS . (17) 
We can write the indifference condition (3) as ( )11 -- -+= tttt qqddss , the first 
differentials of which w.r.t. 1q  at Sqq =1  becomes ttt dd sdsdyd SSS -= -1 .  Substituting 
it into (17) yields ( )( ) ( )( )1211 21 ---- -----=- tttttt dtdt sdsdasdsdasdsd SSSSSS .  
Rewriting gives 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) 2111 211 ---- --++-= ttdt tdttd sdsdsd SSa aS . (18) 
We can express the above equation in terms of ( )1-- tt bssdS  instead of tsdS , 
where ( )d
db a
a
2
12 --= .  It can be shown that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]22 1122121211 2 -------- ++--=- td dddtttt dbtbtd sdssdssd SaaaaSS . 
By our induction assumptions we have 
( ) ( ) 0
1
21 £- -- Stt d
ssd q
q
b
, and ( ) 0
1
2 <- Std
ds q
q
 
so it follows that 
( ) ( ) 0
1
1 <- - Stt d
ssd q
q
b
, and, therefore, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
1
11
11
1
1
<££££< --- S
t
S
t
S
t
S
t
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds q
q
bq
q
bq
q
bq
q
tt LL . (19) 
Now again let us consider the indifference equation (3) as ( ) tttt dqqd ss -=- -- 11 .  
Summing it up from 2=t  to t=t  and rewriting gives 
( ) å-+-+=
t
tt sss
2
1
1
1
1 td
d
dqq . 
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Taking the first differential w.r.t. 1q  at Sq  and using (19), we get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).11
111111
111
1
1
1
12
1
1
12
1
1
12
12121
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
111
2 1
1
11
11
2 1
1
11
11
1
1
12
S
t
aS
t
aS
t
a
aa
S
t
S
t
S
ttt
t
S
tt
S
t
S
tt
t
SS
t
SS
t
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
ds
d
d
t
t
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
dq
q
d
q
q
bdb
q
q
bq
q
q
q
b
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
d
d
b
b
db
b
d
b
b
bb
d
t
d
d
d
t
d
d
d
---
+---
--
-
-
----
-----
-
>+=+=
=--+>--+=
=-+-+=
=+÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-+>
>+÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-+=
--
-
å
å
 
As tq  and ts  are differentiable at Sqq =1  they can be written as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )SSStaSttaSt od
ds
d
d
s qqqqq
q
q
q
qqqqq -+-÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-=-- -- 11
1
12
2
1
112
2
1 . 
The above inequality implies that ( )( ) 0010 , tSt UtU Î=$ qq  such that for all 01 tUÎq  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 011
1
12
1
112
2
1 <-+--<-- -- SSStataSt od
ds
s qqqqq
q
qqqq , or 
( ) ( )11 qeqqq g tSt s<- , where 12 1-= age . 
Now we will show that all induction assumptions are valid for 2,1=t .  Let us first 
consider the function ( ) ( ) 111111 , qqqhqq -=-= vps .  In terms of the function m  it can 
be written as ( ) ( ) 1111
1
,
qmq
qqm
q
q
q
-= ò dvs .  ( )11 qs  is a continuous function over 
( )SSU qeq m ,00 -º  and differentiable at Sqq =1 .  From the definition of a  it follows 
that ( ) ( )a
d
ds
S --= 1
1
1 q
q
 and ( ) ( )( ) ( )SS oas qqqqq -+---= 1111 1 .  Hence, there exists a 
neighborhood, namely ( )( ) 000101 ,1 UU S Ì= qq , such that for all 011 UÎq  ( ) 011 >qs .  
Obviously, 1q  itself is continuous and differentiable at Sqq =1 .  Then, using the 
definitions of ty  and tz , we get ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 01 2 11
1
2
1
2 <-=-= -- a
a
SS d
d
d
dy
d
dqq
qqq , and 
( ) ( )( ) 012 11
1
2 <--= -- a
a
Sd
dz
d
dqq . 
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Finally, using (13), (15) and (16) yields 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 02 1211
1
12 <-=- --- a
aa
Sd
ssd
d
dqq , and, 
consequently, ( ) 0
1
2 <Sd
ds qq  and 
( )( ) 0
1
12 =- Sd
ssd qq
b
.  That ends the proof of the 
induction argument. 
We finish the proof by showing that for some 0T  we must have ( ) ST qqq >10 , 
hence, for all 0Tt >  and all 
00
1 0Tt
UU ÌÎq : ( ) St qqq >1 .  To see this consider the 
sequence ( )
¥
=þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
11 t
t qq
q
Sd
d
.  The first term of this sequence equals 1.  Moreover, the 
sequence is decreasing with strictly negative increment as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 02 11
1
2
11
1
1
<-=<=- --- a
a
SSSS d
dy
d
dy
d
d
d
d
d
dttt qqqqqq
qqq
q
. 
Thus, there exists a first negative term of ( )
¥
=þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
11 t
t qq
q
Sd
d
, which can be denoted by 
( ) 0
1
0 <S
T
d
d
qq
q
, where ( )( ) úû
ù
êë
é +£ -- 111
2
0 a
aT d
d .  It implies that for all 01 0TUÎq  ( )10 qqq TS < .  
Proof of Proposition 4.2. 
In case when 1-> tt qq  we have tt =- ÷øöçèæ 1
~t  and our indifference equation (2) can be 
written as (3), or ( ) 1111111 ----- +=-+= ttdttdtt qqq spp .  Rewriting yields 
( ) 1111, --- += ttttt sv qqqh d . 
Function ( )ttt qqh ,1-  strictly increases w.r.t. tq  for all 1-tq , so there exists an 
inverse function which determines tq  as a function of ( )11 qq -t  and ( )11 q-ts , 
( )111, --= tttt sdqqq .  This function is defined for all 1q  as long as 
( )( ) ( ) ( )1111111 , qqqqqqh d --- +³ tttt sv .  Using (11) we can write: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1111
1111
,,
,,,,
--
--
---- +=
+
+
tt
ttt
tttttt
t
t
v qg
qqmqqm
qqmqqhqqmqqh
, where tt sdg
1= . 
Then 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
-
-+=+- -
-
--
-
-
-
--- St
St
tt
t
t
tt
t
ttttt
v
y
t
vy qq
qq
qqhqgqqm
qqmqgqqh 1
1
11
1
1
1
111
,
,
,
, , and 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )Sttt
t
t
ttttt gtF
vy qqqgqqmgqqqh -+=-- ------- 1111111
,
, . 
where g  and tF  were defined in (9) and (6) correspondingly.  Then we get: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )Sttt
t
t
ttt
t
ttt
t gtF
vy
y
vy qqqgqqmgqqqqh -+=--+- -------- 11111111
2 ,1
,
, and 
( ) ( )( )( ) 0, 111112 =-+-+ ----- Sttt
t
t
tttt gtF
yKvy qqqgqqmj , (20) 
where tK  and 1-tj  were defined in (5) and (10) correspondingly. 
Now let us take any 0>Se  and any ( ){ }( )Sqqee gq -Î 21,min,0 .  Then we take a 
small 0>e  such that ( ) þý
ü
î
í
ì
-
< - qd
d e
qq
ee
3
1,
12
,1min1
v
S
v , a small 01 >e  such that 
( ){ }SS v qee 1,min211 -< , and a large T  such that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ïþ
ï
ý
ü
ïî
ï
í
ì
-
--
+
> 22
11
4,1
4
,1max
,1
Sm
v
vM
m
g
T
qq
qqq
edee
qqme
h
h
m
g .  By the assumption of the 
Proposition 4.2 for that T  there exist corresponding ( )( )ST TU qq ,010 =  and ( )0TT UQ . 
Now let us take the subset ( )( ) 0010 ,ˆˆ TST UTU Ì= qq  such that for all 01 ˆTUÎq : 
a) ( ) qd eqqq 311111 <+- sS ; 
b) qeqq <- ST ; 
c) ( ) ( )( )113supmax 1ˆ,,1 01 --
<
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
Î= T
s
TU
T d
deq qt
qt K
; 
d) ( ) 11 eqj >T  (it is always possible as ( ) ( ) 11 eqqj >-= SST v ). 
Now we will prove that if for all 01 ˆTUÎq  and some 1+³ Tt  ( ) 111 eqj >-t , then 
there exist well-defined functions ( )1qqt  and ( )1qts  such that 1--= ttty qq  is 
determined by (20) and ( ) ( ) 0111 >-> - eq dtt ss . 
 32
At first we prove the existence of ( )1qqt  showing that 
( )( ) ( ) ( )1111111 , qqqqqqh d --- +³ tttt sv  if ( ) 011 ³- qjt  and qeqq +<- St 1 : 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ,0,,
,
,,
,
,,
,,,,
,,,
11
2
4
1
11
2
1
1
11
1111
1111111
1
1
>
+
---
>
+
---
>
>÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-
+
+=
=-³-+=+-
----
-
-
--
----
--------
tt
S
tt
t
t
tt
tttt
ttttttttttt
t
mTm
v
t
mtm
v
t
t
v
vvvsv
qqmqqm
qqmqqqq
qqmqqm
qqmqqqq
q
qqmqqm
qqmqqhqqmqqh
qqqhqjqqhqqqh
mhmh
d
 
thus there exist ( )1qqt  and ( )1qts  such that 1--= ttty qq  is determined by (20). 
Using the fact that for 1+= Tt  ( ) 111 eqj >-t  we can solve (20) w.r.t. ty 8: 
( ) ( )( )( )
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
-+++-= ---
-
--
Sttt
tt
tt
t
t
t gtF
vK
vK
y qqqg
j
qqmj
1112
1
11 ,411
2
. (21) 
It can be shown that the expression under the square root above is positive and, 
therefore, ty  is uniquely defined by (21). 
Now we will show that ( )ed -> - 11tt ss .  Using the well-known inequality that for 
all 0>x  xx 2
111 +<+  we get: 
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ,1,,
,4
11
2
11
1
111
1
1
1112
1
11
-----
-
-
---
-
--
<+<-+<
<
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
-+++-=
ttSttt
tt
t
Sttt
tt
tt
t
t
t
g
Tm
g
tF
g
tF
vK
vK
y
degge
e
qqmqqqg
j
qqm
qqqg
j
qqmj
g
m
 
and, therefore, ( )ee ddd -=->-= ---- 1111111 tttttt sssyss . 
Now we will prove that TTS >$ , ( )( ) 01 ˆ, TSSSST UTU S Ì=$ qq  and STQ$  such that for 
all 1,,1 -+= STTt K  and for all 
S
TS
UÎ1q  ( ) 11 --> tt ss ed , 11 ej >-t  and ( ) 111 eqj =- STS . 
Suppose not, then for all 1+³ Tt  and for all 01 ˆTUÎq  ( ) 111 eqj >-t .  But in this 
case we have an induction: for all 1+³ Tt  ( ) ( )( )qqqqq ,111 -Î$ tt  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) 01111 >->$ - qeq d tt ss .  Let fix any 01 ˆTUÎq  and consider the following sequences 
                                                 
8  Another solution is always negative and doesn't satisfy 
1-> tt qq . 
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of numbers: { }¥ += 1Tttq  and { }
¥
+= 1Ttts .  The former increases and is bounded, so 
qqq £=$ ¥¥® ttlim .  The later also increases and +¥=$ ¥® tt slim  as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 11111111 1 ------ +=->-> tvvtvtt ssss d ddddd e . 
But if we take a limit of 1-tj  we get a contradiction: 
( )( ) ( ) -¥=--=--= -¥®¥--¥®¥® 1
1
1
1
1 lim11limlim ttttttt svsv dd qqj , 
as 11 ej >-t  for all 1+³ Tt . 
So, it must be the case that TTS >$ , ( )SSSTSU qq ,1=$  and STQ$  such that for all 
1,,1 -+= STTt K  and for all 
S
TS
UÎ1q  ( ) 011 >-> -tt ss ed , 11 ej >-t  and ( ) 111 eqj =- STS . 
Now we will prove by induction that for all STt ³  ( )( ) StSSSt UtU 11 , -Ì=$ qq  and 
1-QÉQ$ tt  such that ( )( ) 111 eqj =- tSt  and ( ) ( ) ( )1111 qeq d --> tt ss  for all StUÎ1q .  
Suppose that for some STt ³  ( )( ) STSSSt SUtU Ì=$ qq ,1  and tQ$  such that for all 
1,,1 -+= tT Kt  and for all StUÎ1q  ( ) 111 eqjt >- , ( ) ( ) ( ) 01111 >-> - qeq tdt ss  and 
( )( ) 111 eqj =- tSt .  It implies that 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) .1
11
111
2
1
2
1
2
1
12
1
112
1
12
1
1
111111
SSSS
tSttStSt
ttttttt
S
t
S
t
vv
vvvvvvy
vyvyvytstv
eeeqede
qedejqedeedgee
gqgqqqq
=+<-+<
<-+=--+=+<+=
=+--=---+=--
----
----
 
So, ( ) ( ) ( ) SStSt vs eqqq --> 11 1 . 
Summing up the indifference equation (3) in a form ( ) tttt dqqd ss -=- -- 11  from 
2=t  to t=t  we get ( ) ( ) ( )ååå === - -+-=-=-
t
t
tt
t sssss 2122 11 1 t tt tt t ddqqd , or 
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( ) ( )( )
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d
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So, qeqq <- St  for all 
S
tUÎ1q . 
Finally, let us consider ( )( )tSt 1qj : 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ,11
111
11
11
11
11
1
1
1
11
111
11
1
1
1
11
1
11
egddegdede
dgdegegj
gqqqqqj
dd
d
d
ddd
d
d
dd
=--+<--+<
<--+-+<-+-+=
=---+=--=
-
-
-
---
-
-
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tvt
ttttt
tttt
S
t
S
t
S
t
vv
vvy
yvytstvt
 
so ( )( ) 11 eqj <tSt .  On the other hand ( ) ( ) 11 eqqj >-= SSt v  and ( )1qjt  is continuous, so 
( ) ( )( )SSStS tUt qqq ,1 11 =Î+$  such that ( )( ) 11 1 eqj =+tSt , that ends the induction. 
But if ( )( ) 11 1 eqj =+tSt  then we have ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) SStSt tvts eqqq -+->+ ++ 111 1111  as 
was shown above, and let us take ( )( ) StSSSt UtU Ì+=+ qq ,111  so that qeqq <-+ St 1  for all 
S
tU 11 +Îq , that ends the proof.  
Proof of Proposition 4.3. 
So far we were considering tq  as a function of 1q , ( )1qqq tt = .  Now we will consider 
tq  as a function of 1-tq  and 1-tg , ( )11, --= tttt gqqq , where ( )111 qgg -- = tt  and 
( )111 qqq -- = tt .  We define the following limit function: 
( ) ( )00001 ˆ,ˆlimˆ,ˆˆ gqqgqq tt®¥= . (22) 
In the same spirit as before we introduce functions ( ) ( ) 0001001 ˆˆ,ˆˆˆ,ˆˆ qgqqgq -=y , 
( ) ( )0010001 ˆ,ˆˆˆˆ,ˆˆ gqggq ys -= , ( ) ( )0011001 ˆ,ˆˆˆ,ˆˆ gqgqg d s= , ( ) ( ) 00000 ˆˆ1ˆ,ˆˆ gqgqj --= v . 
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Taking the limit (22) explicitly9 yields that the limit actually exists for all 
[ )eqqq -Î ,0ˆ S  and ( )( )eqqqheg --Î 000 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ v  where 0>e  is an arbitrarily small 
number.  Convergence is uniform, hence ( )001 ˆ,ˆˆ gqq  is continuous and it follows that 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )îí
ì
--<£-+=
-£<=
eqqqhgqgqqqhgqq
qgeqgqq
00000010001
000
001 ˆ,ˆˆˆ1 if ,ˆˆˆ,ˆ:ˆ,ˆˆ
ˆ1ˆ if ,ˆ
ˆ,ˆˆ
vvv
v
. 
Then we define ( )001 ˆ,ˆˆ gqq  on a boundary where 0ˆ0 =g , ( ) 000 ˆ,ˆˆ qqqhg -= v  or qq =0ˆ  
by taking corresponding limits of the function ( )001 ˆ,ˆˆ gqq  when 0+®e , that yields 
( ) 001 ˆ0,ˆˆ qqq = , ( )( ) qqqqhqq =- 0001 ˆ,ˆ,ˆˆ v  and ( ) qgqq =01 ˆ,ˆ 10. 
Finally we define ( )001 ˆ,ˆˆ gqq +t  for all 1>t  as follows.  If for some [ ]qqq ,0ˆ SÎ , 
[ ]010 ˆ,0ˆ qg d-Î v  and for all t,,0 K=t  there exist functions ( )00 ˆ,ˆˆ gqqt  and ( )00 ˆ,ˆˆ gqgt  such 
that ( ) ttt qqqhg ˆ,ˆˆ0 -££ v  and ( ) qgqqt £00 ˆ,ˆˆ  then we take ( ) ( )ttt gqqgqq ˆ,ˆˆˆ,ˆˆ 1001 =+ . 
It can be easily seen that if ( ) ttt qqqhg ˆ,ˆˆ0 -<< v  and ( ) qgqqt <00 ˆ,ˆˆ  then 
( )001 ˆ,ˆˆ gqq +t  has the following limit representation11: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )00001001 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆlimˆ,ˆˆ gqggqqqgqq tttt KK tttt ++++¥®+ = . 
The main use of that trick is to substitute complex functions 
( )( ) ( )( )( )ttttt ------ tttttt gqggqqq ,,, 11 KK  by theirs limit analogs for very large t  when 
the measure of "low quality goods" becomes negligible compare to the measure of 
"high quality goods".  Limit functions ( )00 ˆ,ˆˆ gqqt  would have been exactly the same as 
( )( ) ( )( )( )ttttt ------ tttttt gqggqqq ,,, 11 KK  if there had been no entry of new sellers12. 
                                                 
9  This can be done by considering two cases, namely 0ˆ0 ³j  and 0ˆ0 £j .  The former yields 
0lim =
¥®
t
t
y   while the later yields 011 ˆlim jtt
t
=++
¥®
yvK .  The final result then is 
straightforward. 
10  The expression ( )01 ˆ,ˆ gqq  is defined only if 0ˆ0 ³j , i.e., ( ) 00 ˆ1ˆ qg -£ v . 
11 If ( ) 0ˆ,ˆˆ 00 =gqgt , ( ) ( )( ) ( )000000 ˆ,ˆˆ,ˆ,ˆˆˆ,ˆˆ gqqqgqqhgqg ttt -= v  or ( ) qgqqt =00 ˆ,ˆˆ  for some t  the function 
( )001 ˆ,ˆˆ gqqt +  is not a limit function any more, but after all derivations have been made those functions will 
never be evaluated at such points. 
12  No entry case is described in Janssen and Roy (1999a). 
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Now let us fix ( )kqq =0ˆ  and take any 
( )( )kv qg d 10 ,0ˆ -Î .  If for some 0³t  we have 
obtained the functions ( ) ( )000 ˆˆˆ,ˆˆ gqgqq tt =  and ( ) ( )000 ˆˆˆ,ˆˆ gggqg tt = , and at the same time 
( ) ttt qqqhg ˆ,ˆˆ0 -£< v  then there exists the next function, namely 
( ) ( ) ( )( )00101 ˆˆ,ˆˆˆˆˆ gggqqgq ttt =+  such that ( ) [ ]qqgq tt ,ˆˆˆ 01 Î+  for all ( )( )kv qg d 10 ,0ˆ -Î . 
We will show that 0ˆ ³$t  and ( )( )kv qg d 1,0ˆ -Î$  such that either ( ) 0ˆˆˆ =gg t , or 
( ) ( )( ) ( )gqqgqhgg ˆˆ,ˆˆˆˆ ˆˆˆ ttt v -> . 
Suppose not, that means that for any 0³t  and any ( )( )kv qg d 10 ,0ˆ -Î  ( )0ˆˆ gqt$  and 
( )0ˆˆ gg t$  such that ( ) ttt v qqqhg ˆ,ˆˆ0 -£<  and ( ) qqq ££ tk ˆ .  Let fix any ( )( )kv qg d 1,0ˆ -Î  
and get infinite sequences ( ){ }¥=0ˆˆ tt gq  and ( ){ }¥=0ˆˆ tt gg .  The former is weakly increasing 
and bounded so qqq £=$ ¥¥®
ˆˆlim tt .  But this implies that the later has a limit either 
( ){ } ( ) ( ) 0ˆ1ˆˆ,ˆˆˆ,ˆlimˆlim 1 >-=-=-= ¥¥¥¥+¥®¥® qqqqhqqqhg vvv tttttt .  Taking a limit of the 
indifference equation ( )tttt qqggd ˆˆˆˆ 11 --= ++  gives rise to a contradiction: 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ¥¥®+¥®+¥®¥ -==--==- qgqqggdqd ˆ1ˆlimˆˆˆlimˆlimˆ1 11 vv tttttttt . 
So, only two possibilities are left: 
a) Case 1.  tˆ$  and ( )( )kv qg d 1,0ˆ -Î$  such that for all 1ˆ,,1 -= tt K  and all ( )gg ˆ,0ˆ0 Î  
0ˆ >tg , ( ) 111 ˆˆ,ˆ --- +³ tttv gqqqh , 0ˆˆ >tg  while ( )( ) ( ) ( )gggqqgqh ˆˆˆˆ,ˆˆ 1ˆ1ˆ1ˆ --- +< tttv ; and 
b) Case 2.  tˆ$  and ( )( )kv qg d 1,0ˆ -Î$  such that for all tt ˆ,,1 K=  and all ( )gg ˆ,0ˆ0 Î  
0ˆ >tg  and ( ) 111 ˆˆ,ˆ --- +³ tttv gqqqh  while ( ) 0ˆˆˆ =gg t . 
The detailed proof of the Cases is on request.  We prove that in the Case 1 
0>$ Se  such that for any T  Tt >$ , ( ) ( )SSt qeqq m ,~1 -Î$  and ( )1~qtQ$  such that 
( ) qqq =1~t  and ( ) Sts eq >1~ .  In other words in this case there exist infinite number 
equilibrium sequences such that all goods are traded in the last period. 
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In the Case 2 we define ( )1+kq  as ( ) ( )gqq ˆˆˆ1 tk =+ .  We show that ( ) ( )( ]qqq ,1 kk vÎ+ .  
Then we prove that either we have the same result as in the Case 1, or for any 0>Se  
and 0>qe  
( ) ( )k
S
k
S TT >$
+1  such that for all ( )1+> kSTt  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ktkt UktktU Ì++=$ + 1,,1, 111 qq  and ( )( )1+Q$ ktt U  such that for all ( )11 +Î ktUq  
( ) ( ) qeqqq <- +11 kt , ( ) Sts eq <£ 10  and ( ) ( ) ( ) Stt vs eqqq --> 11 1 . 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. 
Consequently applying Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 we get the following result: for any 
0>Se  and 0>qe  ST$  such that for all STt ³  ( )( )SSSt tU qq ,1=$  and ( )Stt UQ$  such 
that for any StUÎ1q  ( ) ( )qeqqqq +Î SSt ,1  and ( ) ( ) ( ) SStSt vs eqqq --> 11 1 .  Now we can 
see that we are under the conditions of Proposition 4.3 if we take ( ) qqq <= S
1 .  Here 
we distinguish three cases. 
a) Case 1.  For any ¥= K,1k  there exists ( ) ( )( )qqq ,1 kk vÎ+  such that for any 0>Se  
and 0>qe  
( )1+$ kST  such that for all 
( )1+> kSTt  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )ktkt UktktU Ì++=$ + 1,,1, 111 qq  and ( )( )1+Q$ ktt U  such that: 
· for all ( )11
+Î ktUq  ( ) ( ) qeqqq <- +11 kt ; 
· ( )( ) St kts eq <+£ 1,0 1 ; 
· ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) Stt ktvkts eqqq -+->+ 1,11, 11 . 
But in this case we get infinite sequence ( ){ }¥=1kkq  where ( ) ( )kk vqq >+1 , that 
contradicts with ( ) qq <k  as ( ) +¥=
¥®
k
k
qlim .  So after some steps kˆ  we must meet 
either the Case 2 or Case 3. 
b) Case 2.  There exists ( )kˆq  such that there does not exist ( ) ( )( ]qqq ,1 kk vÎ+ .   In 
accordance with Proposition 4.3 we can make a conclusion: 0>$ Se  such that for 
any T  Tt >$ , ( )t1~q$  and ( )1~qtQ$  such that ( ) qqq =1~t  and ( ) Sts eq >1~ .  In other 
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words there are infinite number of equilibrium sequences such that all goods are 
sold in the last period and the last marginal surplus is strictly positive and 
separated from zero, ( ) 0~1 >> Sts eq . 
In this case we can construct infinite number of dynamic equilibria by 
concatenating equilibrium sequences, e.g. we take { }tt 1==Q ttq  and let a dynamic 
equilibrium be the following sequence of marginal sellers: { }¥=1ttq  such that 
tt qq =  if t£t  and t-= tt qq  if t>t . 
c) Case 3.  There exists ( )kˆq  such that there exists ( ) qq =+1k . 
Note here that ( )1+kq  is determined in terms of the previous point ( )kˆq , the 
measure function ( )qm  and parameters q , v  and d .  In other words 
( ) ( ) ( )( )dqqmqq ,,,,1 vkk W=+ , where ( ) ( )( )dqqmq ,,,, vkW  is some operator.  
Therefore the case when ( ) ( )( ) qdqqmq =W ,,,, vk  is non-generic.  
Proof of Proposition 4.4. 
We begin with solving the system of indifference equations (4) w.r.t. tp : 
( ) ( )1
1
11 11 -
-
- --=-- t
t
tt d
dqdq
t
t pp , 1,,1 -= tKt . (23) 
We will look for such a sequence of functions ( ){ }t 11 =tt qq  satisfying (4) that tt qq <+1  
for all 2,,1 -= tKt .  In this case we have ( ) ( ) ò=
tq
qt
tt mqqqm
q dvp
,
, and ( ) a
d
dp
S =qqt
t .  
Substituting this into the first differential of (23) we get ( ) ( )( )tt
t
d
d
d
q
q
q
-
-
- --
--= t
t
S a
a
d
d
1
11 1
1
1
. 
Hence, we can write ( )1qqt  and ( )1qts as ( ) ( )( ) ( )SSSS od
d qqqqq
q
qqqq tt -+--= 11
1
1  
and ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )SSS od
d
as qqqqq
q
qq tt -+---= 11
1
1 1 .  Then 
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( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ).11
111
1
11
1
11
111
1
11
1
11
1
1
SStt
t
SSt
t
t
t
o
aa
aa
o
a
a
a
a
qqqq
ddd
dd
qqqq
d
d
dd
d
d
qq
ttt
tttttt
-+-
----
-----=
=-+-÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
--
--+
--
---=-
---
-
-
-
---
-
+
 
It follows that if d-< 1a  then ( ) 1
1
>Sd
d q
q
qt .  Thus there exists a neighborhood, 
namely ( )( )St tU qq ,1010 1 -=- , such that for all 0 11 -Î tUq  Sqqt <  and, therefore, tt qq <+1 , 
and 0>ts .  Therefore there exists a sequence of functions ( ){ } 111
-
=
t
tt qq  such that all 
conditions to be proved are satisfied except the last one and we only have to show that 
if ( )( )daa ~,0Î  then there exists ( )1qqt  and ( )( ) 0 1010 , -Î= tSt UtU qq such that for all 
0
1 tUÎq  ( ) ( )1110 qeqqq dg tSt s<-< . 
Given the structure of ( ){ }t 11 =tt qq  we can write: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )å
å
-
=
-
=
-
ò-ò
== 1
1
11
1
1
112111
,,
,,,
11
t
t
t
ttt
t
ddt
vpp
t
t
t
t
qq
q
qq
q
qqqmqqqm
mqmq
qqqqqqq
t
K , 
and, consequently, 
( )
( )
.
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
--
---=
=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
--
---=÷
ø
öç
è
æ -=
å
åå
-
=
-
-
-
=
-
-
-
-
=
t
t
t
StS
t
t
t
StS
t
StStS
a
a
dtda
a
a
dtdadtdapd
t
t
t
t
tt
t
t
d
d
d
dqq
d
d
d
qqqq
 
Substituting this into the first differential of (4) yields 
( ) ÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-
--
--= å
-
=
-
-
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
t
t
t
S
t
a
a
at
a
d
d
t
t
t
d
d
d
dq
q
q
, 
and, therefore, 
( )( ) ( )SSStSt od
d qqqqq
q
qqq -+-+= 11
1
. 
This implies that there exists a neighborhood ( )( ) 0 1010 , -Î= tSt UtU qq , such that for 
all 01 tUÎq  St qq >  as long as 11
1
1
<
--å
-
=
t
a
a
t
t
t
d
d
.  So the condition 1
11
£
--å
¥
=t
t
t
d
d
a
a  
actually is a sufficient one.  Note here that 
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( )( )
( )
( )( ),11
1
1
11111
2
1
1
11
dd
d
dd
dd
d
d
d
d
d
d
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
---
--+=
=
---
=
--
=
--
<
-- ååå
¥
=
-
¥
=
¥
=
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
 
so if ( )21 d-£a  then 1
11
<
--å
¥
=t
t
t
d
d
a
a  and ( )21 d-£a  is a sufficient condition. 
Then we check whether 0>ts : 
( ) 111 11
1
1
1
1
1 q
d
dq
t d
d
t
t
S
t
at
t
tStStS daat
a
dpdsd ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -----=-= å -= ---
-
. 
Hence, ( ) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ ----< -
-
at
a
d
ds
t
t
S
t 11
1
1
1
1 d
dq
q
 and it follows that ( ) 0
1
<Std
ds q
q
 when at
1> .  
So there exists [ ] 110 += aT  such that for all 0Tt >  ( ) 0010 , tSt UtU Ì÷ø
öçè
æ=$ qq  and 
÷ø
öçè
æQ$ 02 tt U  such that for all 
0
1 tUÎq  ( ) St qqq >1 , ( ) 01 >qts .  ( ) SS qqqt =  and ( ) 0=Ss qt  
for all t,,1K=t  by construction. 
Finally we will prove that if t  is taken sufficiently large than 0>$ ge  such that 
( ) ( )1110 qeqqq dg tSt s<-< . 
Let us consider the ratio 
( )
( ) St
ts
qqq
q
-1
1 .  It can be written as 
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( )
1
1
1
1 1
0
1
11
11
1
1
1
1 -
-
-+=
-+-
-+-
=
- å -= --
t
a
S
SSSd
d
SSSd
ds
St
t
a
oat
o
os
t
t
t d
d
q
q
q
t
t
qq
qqqqq
qqqqq
qqq
q
.  Therefore 
( )
( ) +¥=--
=ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
- å -= --¥®-®¥®
1
1
limlimlim 1
1 11
1
01
t
a
t
St
t
t a
ats
S
t d
dqq
t
tqqq
q
. 
This implies that we actually can take any 0>ge  such that 00 TT >$  such that for 
all 0Tt >  ( )( )St tU qq ,010 =$  and ( )02 tt UQ$  such that ( ) ( )1110 qeqqq dg tSt s<-< .  
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Proof of Proposition 4.5. 
Suppose we have obtained an equilibrium sequence ( )0
11 kk
UQ , where ( )( )Sk kU qq ,10101 =  
such that for all 1,,1 kK=t  tq  and ts  can be represented as 
( )( ) ( )SSSS od
d qqqqq
q
qqq tt -+-+= 11
1
, and ( )( ) ( )SSS od
ds
s qqqqq
q
t
t -+-= 11
1
 where 
( ) 0
1
<Sd
ds q
q
t  and ( ) 0
1
1 >S
k
d
d
q
q
q
, and for all 01 1kUÎq  ( ) ( ) Sk qqqqqt << 11 1 . 
We introduce the following new variable: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
>÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-=-º
-
S
k
S
k
S
k
k
k d
ds
d
d
d
ds
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
a . (24) 
In terms of 
1k
a , surplus 
1k
s  can be represented as ( ) ( ) ( )SkSkkk os qqqqaq -+-= 1111 1 .  
There exists at least one of such a sequence, namely { }1q , where 11 =k . 
Now we will construct a new equilibrium sequence ( )
1kt
QQ  in the following way.  
We will repeat the whole structure of 
1k
Q  t  times.  In other words, for all 
1,,1 -= tKt  and for all 1,,1 1 -= kl K  we put ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11111 11 qqqq tt lklk +-++- <  if 
( ) ( )111 qqqq ll <+  and vice versa.  Another rule is that for all t,,2 K=t  
( ) ( ) ( )111 11 qqqq tt kk -< . 
Having done this we can see that each of the sequences ( ){ } ( )1 1 111
kl
kll
t
tqq
=
+-=  for all 
t,,1K=t  is an equilibrium sequence 
1k
Q .  Now we have to find ( )111 qq +tk  such that 
for all t,,1K=t  ( ) ( )
11
1
11
1
1
1
ktk
tk
kk
k pp ttt
t qdqd -=- +
- , in other words, the seller of 
quality 
1kt
q  must be indifferent between selling in time period 1kt  and 11 +tk .  Loosely 
speaking we try to construct a sort of equilibrium sequence of type II using 
1k
Q  as 
single components instead of tq . 
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We will show that if da >
1k
 and 
( )
( ) 1
1
11
11
1 1
1
1
£
-å
¥
=
+-
+-
t
t
t
da
d
k
k
k
ak  then it can be done for 
any t  and if 
1
1
ak
at ->  then 011 >+tks .  Applying the same procedure as in the proof of the 
Proposition 4.4 we get the following indifference equations: 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
1
1
11
1
1
1 1111 11 k
kt
kk
kt
k
k pp qdqdd t
t
t
t +-+-- +-=-- . (25) 
Taking the first differentials of (25) at Sqqt =  and using definition of 1ka  (24) we get: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
1
111
1
11
1 1111
kS
kt
kSkkS
kt
kSk
k dddd qdqaqdqad t
t
tt
t +-+-- +-=+- . 
Using the fact that 
11 kk
aat =  yields 
( )( )
( )
( ) 11
1
1
1
1
1 1
11
1
kSk
kt
k
kS
kt
k dd qd
da
qda tt
t
-
+-
+- -=- , or 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) 1
11
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
+-
+-
- -
-
= kt
k
kt
k
kS
k
k
d
d
tt
t
da
da
d
q
q
q
.  Hence, we can write ( )11 qqtk  and ( )11 qtks  as: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )SSSkS
k
k
Sk od
d
d
d
qqqqq
q
q
q
q
q
qqq tt -+-×-= 11
1
1
1
1
1
1
, and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )SSSk
k
k
kSkSkkk od
d
d
d
os qqqqq
q
q
q
q
aqqqqaq ttttt -+-=-+-= 11
1
1
1
1
1
11111
.  Then 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ).
1
11
1
111
11
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
SSS
k
kt
k
kt
k
k
k
kkt
k
SSS
k
S
k
k
S
k
k
kk
o
d
d
o
d
d
d
d
d
d
qqqqq
q
q
dadad
adda
qqqqq
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
qq
ttt
tt
tt
-+-
--
--
-=
=-+-÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
+-=-
+-+--
+-
+
+
 
It follows that for any t,,1K=t  ( ) 1
1
1 ³S
k
k
d
d
q
q
qt  as long as da >
1k
13.  Thus there 
exists a neighborhood, namely ( )( ) 01010 11 , kStk UtkU Ì= qq , such that for all 01 1tkUÎq  
Sk qqt <1  and, therefore, ( ) 111 kk tt qq <+ , and 01 >kst .  Therefore there exists a system of 
functions ( ){ } 111
tkl
ll
=
=qq  which satisfies all the indifference equations (25) such that all 
conditions of ( )
1kt
QQ  are satisfied except the last one and now we have to find 
( ) ( )111 11 qqqq tktk ³+  such that ( ) 0111 >+ qtks . 
                                                 
13  Note that this condition is trivially satisfied for 1=t . 
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Given the structure of ( ){ } 111
tkl
ll
=
=qq  we can write: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )å
å
=
+
=
++
-+
ò-ò+
=
+
t
ktk
t
tktkktk
ktk
dkdtk
vp
ktk
1
11111
1
11
11111
11
11111
1111
,,1
1
,,,
t
t
t
qq
q
qq
q
qqqmqqqm
mqmq
qqqqqq
t
K , 
and, consequently, 
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) .1
1
1
11
1111
1
11
1
1111
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
111
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-
-+=
=÷
ø
öç
è
æ -+=
å
å
=
+-
+-+-
+
=
++
t
k
k
k
tk
kt
k
kStkS
t
kStkStkS
k
ddtka
dkdtkapd
t
t
t
t
t
da
d
d
da
qq
qq
 
Substituting this into the first differential of (25) yields 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-+
-
= å
=
+-
+-
+-
+-
+ 1
1 1
11
11
111
1
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
t
k
k
k
kt
kt
k
S
k
tk ak
tkad
d
t
t
t
da
d
d
da
q
q
q
, 
and, therefore, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )SSSkS
k
tk
Stk od
d
d
d
qqqqq
q
q
q
q
q
qq -+-×+= ++ 11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
. 
This implies that there exists a neighborhood ( )( ) 01010 1 11 ,1 tkStk UtkU Î+=+ qq , such 
that Stk qq >+11  as long as 
( )
( ) 1
1
11
11
1
1
1
1
<
-å= +-
+-t
k
k
kak
t
t
t
da
d
.  So the condition 
( )
( ) 1
1
11
11
1
1
1
1
£
-å
¥
=
+-
+-
t
t
t
da
d
k
k
kak
 
actually is a sufficient one.  Now we will check whether 011 >+tks : 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) 11
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
11
11
1
1
11
11
1 kS
t
k
k
k
kt
kt
k
tkS daktka
sd q
da
d
d
da
t
t
t
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
+÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-+
-
-= å
=
+-
+-
+-
+-
+ , 
and, therefore, 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )S
k
kt
kt
k
S
tk
d
d
tkad
ds
q
q
q
d
da
q
q 11
11
11
1
1 1
1
1
11
1
1
1 ÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
+
-
-
-< +-
+-
+ . 
It follows that ( ) 0
1
11 <+ S
tk
d
ds
q
q
 when 
1
1
ak
a
t
-> . 
Now we will construct the desired equilibrium sequence Q  and our objective is to 
get 
mk
Q  such that 
( )
( ) 1
1
11
11
£
-å
¥
=
+-
+-
t
t
t
da
d
m
m
m
k
k
k
mak .  We start from 11 =k  and 11 Q=Qk .  
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Suppose that da £
1k
 and we cannot take 1>t .  In this case we take 1=t , in other 
words we look for 
11 1 kk
qq >+ .  It follows that 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) 011 1
1
1
1
1
1 111 >
+
-+
=
+
+-
=+
d
add
d
dad
q
q
q
ka
ak
ka
ak
d
d kk
S
k , 
and Sk qq <+11 , hence 011 >+ks , in some left neighborhood of Sq .  We take 
( )
12 1 kk
QQºQ , where 112 += kk , as an initial equilibrium sequence and repeat the 
described procedure again. 
Now we will prove that after some n  steps we get da >
nk
.  To do so we take a 
lower limit of 
n
n
k
k
a
a
1+  with ¥®n .  In this case ¥®
¥®n
nk  as 11 +=+ nn kk  and we have: 
( )
( )
( )( )
( ) .
1
11
lim
1
lim
1
11
1
1
lim
1
limlim
1
1
1
n
k
nk
kknk
knk
k
n
kn
k
k
n
n
k
n
k
k
k
k
knk
k
n
ak
ak
a
ak
aka
ka
ak
ak
ka
d
d
d
ds
n
n
nnn
nn
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
nn
n
ad
d
a
d
dada
aad
d
dad
a
da
d
d
da
q
q
q
aa
a
-
+
-
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-+
=
+-
+--
=
=
÷÷
÷
÷
÷
÷
ø
ö
çç
ç
ç
ç
ç
è
æ
+
+-
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
+÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-+
-
-
-=
÷÷
÷
÷
÷
ø
ö
çç
ç
ç
ç
è
æ
-
=
¥®¥®
¥®+
+
¥®¥®
+
 
Suppose da £
nk
 for any n , then 
1
11
limlim 1 >=
+
>
¥®¥®
+
dda
a
d
n
nn
n
akkk
k
n
. 
But this implies that +¥=
¥® nkn
alim  that contradicts with da £
nk
. 
Hence, there exists some number n  such that we get ( ){ } n
n
k
k
=
==Q
t
tt qq 11  and 
da >
nk
. 
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Then we check whether 
( )
( ) 1
1
11
11
1
£
-å
¥
=
+-
+-
t
t
t
da
d
n
n
k
k
k
nak  or not.  If it is then we are done.  In 
the case 
( )
( ) 1
1
11
11
1
>
-å
¥
=
+-
+-
t
t
t
da
d
n
n
k
k
k
nak  we will show that it is possible to find nt  such that in 
equilibrium sequence ( )
nnn kk
QQ=Q
+ t1
 we get Sk nn qqt <+1 . 
We take 1=nt  and if ( ) 01 >+ S
k
k
n
n
d
d
q
q
q
 then ( )
nn kk
QQ=Q
+ 11
 and Sk n qq <+1  in some 
neighborhood of Sq .  If ( ) 01 £+ S
k
tk
n
n
d
d
q
q
q
 for some t , then it follows that 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) 011 1
11
11
11
11
1 <÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-+
-
= å
=
+-
+-
+-
+-
+
t
k
k
k
n
kt
n
kt
k
S
k
tk
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n ak
tkad
d
t
t
t
da
d
d
da
q
q
q
, or 
( )
( ) 1
1
11
11
<
-å= +-
+-t
k
k
k
n
n
n
nak
t
t
t
da
d
.  
On the other hand we have made an assumption that 
( )
( ) 1
1
11
11
>
-å
¥
=
+-
+-
t
t
t
da
d
n
n
n
k
k
k
nak .  Therefore 
there exists nt , such that 
( )
( ) 1
1
1
11
11
<
-å
-
=
+-
+-n
n
n
n
j
kj
k
kj
nak
t
da
d
 while 
( )
( ) 1
1
11
11
³
-å= +-
+-n
n
n
n
j
kj
k
kj
nak
t
da
d
, and we 
have for ( )
nnn kk
QQ=Q
+ t1
: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) .1111
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
11
11
11
1
1
11
11
11
11
1
<
+
<÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
+÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-
-
+
=
=
+
+÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-+
-
=
å
å
-
=
+-
+-
+-
+-
-
=
+-
+-
+-
+-
+
nn
n
n
j
kj
k
kj
n
nk
k
k
nn
nn
n
j
kj
k
kj
n
k
nn
k
k
S
k
k
ka
ak
ak
ak
ak
ka
ka
akak
kad
d
n
n
n
n
nn
nn
n
n
n
n
n
nn
nn
n
n
nn
tda
d
d
da
t
tda
d
dt
da
q
q
q
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
 
In other words, Skkk nnnn qqqq t <=< ++ 11  and 011 >= ++ nnn kk ss t , and we can continue with 
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So, 1lim ¹
¥®n
nt  and there exists a subsequence ln  such that ¥®
®¥l
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Taking an upper limit along that subsequence yields: 
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Using the inequality (26) we get: 
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Thus, we have proved the following statement: m$  and, therefore 1³$ mk , such 
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Finally we will prove that if t  is taken sufficiently large than 0>$ ge  such that 
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This implies that we actually can take any 0>ge  such that 00 TT >$  such that for 
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